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I. Ethics
A. The nature, source, and purpose of ethics.
1. A dictionary definition of "ethics" is "a
system of moral principles." The Random House Dic-
tionary of the English Language (1967). "Moral" is
something "of, pertaining to, or concerned with right
conduct or the distinction between right and wrong."
Id. Together, ethics is a system of principles that is
concerned with right conduct.
a. Lawyers are not alone in their interest
in ethics.
b. Every person, whether knowingly or
unknowingly, develops and constantly refines a pri-
vate system of ethics.
c. "[T]he rules governing the legal pro-
fession are not about morality as much as they are
guidelines and prohibitions that regulate the practice
of law and, as such, are as susceptible to learning as
the Internal Revenue Code or a local probate prac-
tice." Pennell, "Professional Responsibility: Reforms
are Needed to Accommodate Estate Planning and
Family Counseling," 25 U. Miami Inst. on Estate
Planning, Ch. 18 (1991) (Hereafter, "Pennell").
2. Almost every jurisdiction has an explicit
code or set of rules governing professional ethics for
lawyers. See II below.
a. Yet oftentimes, and particularly in
relation to estate planning, no rule will explicitly gov-
ern a particular situation or set of circumstances.
Developments Regarding the Professional Responsi-
bility of the Estate Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 Real Prop.,
Prob, & Trust J. 1-2 (1987) (Hereafter "Develop-
ments"). See also, Developments Regarding the Pro-
fessional Liability of the Estate Administration
Lawyer; The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, ABA Committee on Significant New Devel-
opments in Probate and Trust Law Practice (A-4)
(11/29/90); Avery, The Rules of Professional Conduct
for Lawyers Are Confusing, Trusts & Estates (April
1992); Pennell, supra, 1801.
b. "...model ethics rules do little to
instruct the [estate] planner: they assume the exis-
tence of either an active transaction between two par-
ties or litigation between two parties. They also
assume that the identity and interests of each client are
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clear. In most cases they fail to serve the [estate] plan-
ner." Hilker, 37th Annual Seattle Estate Planning
Seminar, Chapter lA (1992) (Hereafter "Hilker").
c. "In large measure the duties of trusts
and estates lawyers are defined in many states by opin-
ions rendered in malpractice actions, which provide
incomplete and insufficient guidance regarding the
ethical duties of lawyers." ACTEC Commentaries on
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1993,
Reporter's Note (hereafter "ACTEC Commentaries").
d. If no rule governs a particular situa-
tion, does this mean there is no ethical requirement? If
there is an ethical requirement, from whence does it
spring?
e. "...a lawyer is also guided by personal
conscience and the approbation of professional peers."
Preamble to ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 1983.
3. Why has the legal profession developed
its own rules of ethics? An economic argument can be
made that in the long run adherence to ethical stan-
dards will maximize profits for the legal profession.
Compare Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common
Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad
Ethics?, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 57 (1984). If profit maxi-
mization is not the purpose of codified ethics, what is?
a. Are lawyers more concerned about
morality than are others?
b. Do lawyers need explicit rules of
morality more than others?
c. Is a code of ethics for lawyers intend-
ed to be something more than (or other than) rules of
morality? "Case law recognizes that ethics rules are
meant to instill public confidence in the lawyer." See,
e.g., Jeffrey v. Pounds, 67 Cal. App. 3d 6, 11 (1977),
Hilker, supra, p. 5.
d. Does a code of ethics reduce the num-
ber of lawsuits against lawyers? See Johnston, Avoid-
ing Malpractice Liability in the Estate Planning Con-
text, 43 USC Law Center Tax Inst. 1700 (1991) and
Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning-
You've Got to Know When to Hold Up, Know When to
Fold Up, 37 Kan. L. Rev. 193 (1990).
e. "Violation of a Rule should not give rise
to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption
that a legal duty has been breached." ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, "Scope" 6, 1983.
f. "The Rules are designed to provide
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guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for reg-
ulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They
are not designed to be a basis for civil liability."
ACTEC Commentaries, supra, Reporter's Note.
B. As a practical matter, a lawyer who violates a
written ethical standard may be a "sitting duck" in a
malpractice or tort liability lawsuit. Bruce, Ethics in
Estate Planning and Estate Administration, 15 Pro-
bate Notes 118, Fall, 1989.
1. "Disappointed beneficiaries are increas-
ingly positing their malpractice claims on alleged vio-
lations of ethic code provisions..." Johnson, Estate
Planning Malpractice-Trap for the Unwary, ABA
Tax Section, Estate & Gift Tax Committee Meeting,
May 16, 1992 (Hereafter, "Johnson").
2. Other "sanctions" are possible as well.
"...we hold that an attorney who violates our rules of
professional conduct... may receive neither executor's
nor legal fees for services he renders an estate."
Estate of McCool, 553 A2d 761, 769 (NH 1988).
C. Lawyers engaged in estate planning frequent-
ly have competing responsibilities, the specifics of
which are not always clear.
1. The authors of one particular article
described estate planners as facing a "three-pronged
dilemma":
[Conflicting interests] create problems for the
lawyer who must meet his or her legal respon-
sibilities to the client by explaining all the
alternatives and their potential outcomes,
while also meeting his or her ethical responsi-
bility to avoid having the recommendations to
one client affect the interests of another client,
as well as satisfying the moral obligation of
assisting the client in choosing the "best"
choice for the client's particular situation.
Adcock and Valentine, The Estate Plan-
ner's Dilemma: Reconciling Legal, Ethical and Moral
Responsibilities, Fla. Bar J., (Jan. 1986).
2. The authors of a text designed primarily
for tax lawyers talk about the lawyer's obligation to
"the system" ["an imprecise concept blending together
notions of society, the profession, and the law"]:
Ordinarily, in performing his duty to the
client, the lawyer carries out his duty to the
system as well. There are times, however,
when the lawyer, while pursuing his client's
interests competently, loyally, and discreetly,
must hold himself and his client's interests in
check in order to perform the less defined,
seemingly contradictory duty which he owes
to the system as a whole.
Wolfman and Holden, Ethical Problems in
Federal Tax Practice, 2d ed., The Michie Company,
Charlottesville, Virginia, 1985, p. 1.
3. But, another scholar defends a lawyer's
freedom to represent a client free from the "universal-
izing claims of morality":
I will argue in this essay that it is not only
legally but also morally right that a lawyer
adopt as his dominant purpose the furthering
of his client's interests-that it is right that a
professional put the interests of his client
above some idea, however valid, of the collec-
tive interest.
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale
L.J. 1060 (1976).
II. Specific Rules
A. The American Bar Association (ABA) has two
sets of model standards of professional ethics in cur-
rent use among the various jurisdictions, the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Model Code) and the
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). The
ABA does not enforce either. Lawyers' professional
conduct is regulated and enforced by states, which
generally follow either the Model Code or Model
Rules.
1. The Model Code was adopted by the ABA
in 1969 pursuant to a perceived need for change in the
profession's ethical code. The original set of ethical
standards released by the ABA had been adopted in
1908 and contained 32 Canons of Ethics. These 32
canons had grown in number to 47 by the early 1960s,
but were still quite brief and considered inadequate.
See, G. Hazard & D. Rhode, The Legal Profession:
Responsibility and Regulation 99-100 (1988). The
Model Code reduced the number of canons to nine,
but included under each a set of Ethical Considera-
tions and Disciplinary Rules. The Model Code was
eventually adopted by nearly every state in the union.
Id. at 100.
2. The content and structure of the Model
Code came under much attack in the years after its
adoption. Also, events of the 1970s such as Watergate
and Supreme Court decisions on advertising and solic-
itation focused the profession's and the public's atten-
tion on the professional ethics of lawyers. Id. The
ABA began another examination of its model ethical
standards and in 1983 adopted the Model Rules.
3. The Model Rules follow a Rules and
Commentary format similar to the ALI Restatement of
Laws rather than the more complicated system of
Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules employed by the Model Code. The Model
Rules are gaining increasing acceptance among the
states. Developments, supra, at 1.
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4. By 1994, more than two-thirds of the
States and the District of Columbia had adopted the
Model Rules with some modification.
B. "[T]he Model Rules [,as well as the Model
Code,] do not deal effectively with some of the most
important and most difficult problems of professional
conduct in the practice of estate planning...." Devel-
opments, supra, at 1. Developments is a report sub-
mitted by the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law's Committee on Significant New
Developments in Probate and Trust Law Practice.
1. Based on its examination of the Model
Rules and a comparison of the Model Rules with the
Model Code, the committee has recommended that a
set of ethical standards be drawn up specifically for
the areas of probate and trust practice. Id. at 2.
a. The ABA Special Probate and Trust
Division Study Committee on Professional Responsi-
bility has prepared The Lawyer's Duties in Representing
Husband and Wife, 1992 (hereafter "Representing Hus-
band and Wife"). It has been approved by both the Divi-
sion Council and by the Council of the Section as a
whole. While not an official interpretation of the law
governing legal ethics, it has been offered as a "pre-
scriptive guide" to the "serious ethics issues estate plan-
ners routinely face." See generally, Moore and Hilker,
Representing Both Spouses: The New Section Recom-
mendations, 7 Prob. & Prop. 26 (July/Aug. 1993).
b. The same group has also prepared
Counseling the Fiduciary, 1993. It encourages the use
of written agreements that set forth the duties of the
lawyers and then provides guidance as to the "default
rules" (i.e., the rules in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary).
2. The American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel ("ACTEC") has developed a set of commen-
taries that are intended to "fill the gap" by providing par-
ticularized guidance to trust and estate attorneys regard-
ing their professional responsibilities. Copies may be
purchased for $9.50 per copy from ACTEC (3415 South
Sepulveda Blvd. #460, Los Angeles, CA 90034. Tele-
phone (310) 398-1888; Fax (310) 572-7280).
III. Application of Specific Rules
A. Relationships. Ethical standards specific to
estate planning generally arise out of relationships
between the estate planner and other parties. The most
exacting of these standards result from the establish-
ment of the attorney-client relationship. Price, Profes-
sional Responsibility in Estate Planning: Progress or
Paralysis?, 1987 U. Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. 18-4
(1987).
1. [T]he probate, trust and estate plan-
ning practitioner is frequently found in a
thicket of multiple representations where the
conflicts between the various parties' interests
are subtle, pervasive, indirect, continuously
shifting and, in many instances, even difficult
to recognize. Developments, supra, at 2.
2. Although the term "client" is important in
both the Model Code and the Model Rules, it is
defined in neither. The "scope" section of the Pream-
ble to the Model Rules, however, states that "[w]het-
her a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific
purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be
a question of fact." See, Developments, supra, at 14-
15.
3. The attorney-client relationship is con-
tractual in nature. As with contracts generally, an
express agreement is not necessary for formation.
Rather, agreement may be implied from the circum-
stances. Price, supra, at 18-4. Indeed, the perceptions
of the "client" may be given the most weight by a
court. See, e.g., In re McGlothlen, 99 Wash. 2d 515,
522, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983).
B. General Duties. The estate planning lawyer
has a number of duties in common with lawyers gen-
erally. Important among these are the duties of compe-
tence, diligence, communication, and confidentiality.
1. Competence.
a. Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules states:
A lawyer shall provide competent representa-
tion to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.
b. DR 6-101 of the Model Code
states: (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) handle a
legal matter which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle, without
associating with him a lawyer who is compe-
tent to handle it; (2) handle a legal matter
without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances; or (3) neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him.
c. The comment to Rule 1.1, above,
states that "[i]n many instances, the required profi-
ciency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a
particular field of law may be required in some cir-
cumstances." One is left to guess whether estate plan-
ning is an area where expertise of some sort is
required.
(1) One court has indicated that a
generalist who undertakes legal work that should be
referred to a specialist will be held to the same stan-
dard of care as the specialist. Horne v. Peckham, 97
Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979).
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(2) This standard-legal work that
should be referred to a specialist-is not particularly
helpful, especially in situations where the lawyer
accepts employment in an area in which he or she is
not currently qualified but expects to become qualified
through study and investigation. Johnston, Legal Mal-
practice in Estate Planning-Perilous Times Ahead
for the Practitioner, 67 Iowa L.R. 629 at 684 (1982).
(3) On the other hand, one practition-
er has suggested that the actual standard will surprise
many:
While it may be assumed that the standard of
care of a general practitioner may be less than that of
the legal specialist, it is not necessarily true in practice.
In my own observation, many times general practition-
ers who adequately prepare in a given area perform
even better services than some who claim to be special-
ists. The general practitioner does not seem to suffer
the legal myopia of the specialist and sometimes per-
ceives other effects of a transaction or outcome more
clearly. Kasten, Attorney Malpractice in Illinois: An
Early Chapter in a Book Destined for Great Length, 13
J. Mar. L. Rev. 309, 316 n. 41 (1980).
d. According to the ACTEC Commen-
tary on Model Rule 1.1:
The fact that a lawyer does
not precisely assess the tax or substantive
law consequences of a particular transaction
does not necessarily reflect a lack of compe-
tence. In some instances the facts are unclear
or disputed, while in others the state of the
law is unsettled. In addition, some applica-
tions of law and determinations of facts made
by courts or administrative agencies are not
reasonably foreseeable. In other instances
the complexity of a transaction or its unusual
nature generate uncertainties regarding the
manner in which it will be treated for tax or
substantive law purposes and may prevent an
otherwise thoroughly competent lawyer from
accurately assessing how the transaction
would be treated for tax or substantive law
purposes.
2. Diligence.
a. Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules states:
"A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client."
b. As noted above, DR 6-1O(A)(3) of
the Model Code states that a lawyer shall not
"[n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him." Diligence
also falls under Canon 7 of the Model Code which
instructs that "[a] lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law."
c. The comment to Rule 1.3, above, con-
tains some statements applicable to estate planners.
The comment states that "[a] lawyer should pursue a
matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer."
Also, the comment notes that "[p]erhaps no profes-
sional shortcoming is more widely resented than pro-
crastination. A client's interests often can be adverse-
ly affected by the passage of time or the change of
conditions." Most clearly, a client will be adversely
affected if she dies before her lawyer completes her
estate plan.
d. The ACTEC Commentary on Model
Rule 1.3 suggest that the lawyer and client establish a
timetable for completion of various tasks. It also cau-
tions against "the imposition of time limits that may
prevent the lawyer from consulting fully with the
client or giving a matter the time and attention it
should receive. The lawyer should caution the client
regarding the risks that arise if a matter is pursued on
an abbreviated time schedule that deprives the lawyer
of the opportunity fully to fulfill the lawyer's role."
3. Communication.
a. Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules states:
"(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information. (b)
A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reason-
ably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation."
b. The duty of communication is frag-
mented in the Model Code. The Model Code Compar-
ison included in the Model Rules notes that DR 6-
101(A)(3), providing that a lawyer shall not "[n]eglect
a legal matter entrusted to him," DR 9-102(B)(1), pro-
viding that a lawyer shall "[p]romptly notify a client
of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other proper-
ties," EC 7-8, providing that a lawyer "should exert
his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of rele-
vant considerations," and EC 9-2, providing that "a
lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of
material developments in the matters being handled
for the client," are all relevant.
(1) The lawyer's duty to com-
municate with a client during the active peri-
od of the representation includes the duty to
inform the client reasonably regarding the
law; developments that affect the client; and
the progress of the representation. The
lawyer for an estate planning client should
attempt to inform a client to the extent rea-
sonably necessary to enable the client to
make informed judgments regarding major
issues involved in the representation.
ACTEC Commentary on Model Rule 1.4.
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(2) The execution of estate plan-
ning documents and the completion of relat-
ed matters, such as changes in beneficiary
designations and the transfer of assets to the
trustee of a trust, normally ends the period
during which the estate planning lawyer
actively represents an estate planning client.
At that time, unless the representation is ter-
minated by the lawyer or client, the represen-
tation becomes dormant, awaiting activation
by the client. ACTEC Commentary on
Model Rule 1.4.
(3) Although the lawyer remains
bound to the client by some obligations,
including the duty of confidentiality, the
lawyer's responsibilities are diminished by
the completion of the active phase of the rep-
resentation. As a service the lawyer may
communicate periodically with the client
regarding the desirability of reviewing his or
her estate planning documents. Similarly,
the lawyer may send the client an individual
letter or a form letter, pamphlet, or brochure
regarding changes in the law that might
affect the client. In the absence of an agree-
ment to the contrary, the lawyer is not oblig-
ated to send a reminder to a client whose rep-
resentation is dormant or to advise the client
of the effect that changes in the law or the
client's circumstances might have on the
client's legal affairs. ACTEC Commentary
on Model Rule 1.4.
c. The comment to Rule 1.4 notes that a
problem may arise where the client is a child or suffers
from mental disability. In such a case, communication
might have to be different in form than communica-
tion with competent adults, or it might have to be with
a guardian instead of the client directly. One issue left
open is whether a lawyer for a fiduciary of an estate or
trust may or must communicate directly with benefi-
ciaries of that estate or trust. See, Developments,
supra, at 5.
d. Rule 1.14 provides that when a client's
ability to make adequately considered decisions is
impaired, whether because of minority, mental disabil-
ity or otherwise, the lawyer should maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship as far as reasonably possi-
ble, and should seek a guardian or other protection for
the client only if necessary. If a minor or disabled
client has no guardian, his or her lawyer may be under
an obligation to act as defacto guardian. Comment to
Rule 1.14.
4. Confidentiality.
a. Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consul-
tation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in para-
graph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary:
(1) to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim
or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a con-
troversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based on con-
duct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding con-
cerning the lawyer's representation of the
client.
b. DR 4-101 of the Model Code protects
information that falls under the attorney-client privi-
lege, referred to as "confidences," and information
"gained in the professional relationship" that the client
asked to be kept secret or the disclosure of which
would cause the client embarrassment or other harm,
referred to as "secrets." The disciplinary rule pro-
hibits lawyers from revealing confidences or secrets of
their clients, from using such confidences or secrets to
their clients' disadvantage, and from using such confi-
dences or secrets to the lawyer's own or a third party's
advantage without consent of the client after full dis-
closure. The disciplinary rule does allow the revela-
tion of confidences or secrets (1) with consent of the
client after full disclosure, (2) where permitted by the
Model Code or required by law or court order, and (3)
where necessary to collect the lawyer's fee, or defend
against accusations of wrongful conduct. Also, a
lawyer may reveal his or her client's intention to com-
mit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
the crime.
c. Perhaps the most difficult confiden-
tiality problems for the estate planner, and those most
unique to the estate planning area of practice, arise as
a result of multiparty representation. Multiparty rep-
resentation is very common in estate planning since
clients often desire or request it for cost or other rea-
sons. Developments, supra, at 18. The potential for
conflicts in multiparty representation, however, is
tremendous. See Subsection C, below. These con-
flicts can lead to confidentiality problems. For exam-
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ple, if a lawyer is assisting a couple with their estate
plan, one spouse might relay some information to the
lawyer that he or she would like to keep secret from
such other spouse, but which is material to the estate
plan. Since the information is material to the estate
plan, it is in the other spouse's best interest to know
the information. Such situations should be avoided or
representation of both spouses may have to be with-
drawn.
(1) When the lawyer is first
consulted by the multiple potential clients the
lawyer should review with them the terms
upon which the lawyer will undertake the
representation, including the extent to which
information will be shared among them. The
principal terms should, but need not be,
reflected in a writing a copy of which is
given to each client. ACTEC Commentary
on Model Rule 1.6.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed,
a lawyer who represents multiple clients with
regard to related legal matters is presumed to
represent them jointly. Such a representation
usually implies that information will be
shared by the clients with respect to the sub-
ject of the representation but confidentiality
will be maintained as to all others. ACTEC
Commentary on Model Rule 1.6.
(3) There does not appear to
be any authority that expressly authorizes a
lawyer to represent multiple clients separate-
ly with respect to related legal matters. How-
ever, with full disclosure and the consent of
the clients some experienced estate planners
regularly undertake to represent husbands
and wives as separate clients. Similarly, but
with less frequency, some estate planners
also represent a parent and child or other
multiple clients as separate clients. A lawyer
who is asked to provide separate representa-
tion to multiple clients should do so with
great care because of the stress it necessarily
places on the lawyer's duties of impartiality
and loyalty and the extent to which it may
limit the lawyer's ability to advise each of
the clients adequately. ACTEC Commentary
on Rule 1.6.
(4) [T]he lawyer and the
fiduciary may agree between themselves that
the lawyer may disclose to the beneficiaries
or to an appropriate court action or inaction
on the part of the fiduciary that might consti-
tute a breach of trust. Whether or not the
lawyer and fiduciary enter into such an
agreement, the lawyer for the fiduciary ordi-
narily owes some duties largely restrictive in
nature to the beneficiaries of the fiduciary
estate. The existence of those duties alone
may qualify the lawyer's duty of confiden-
tiality with respect to the fiduciary. In addi-
tion, the lawyer's duties to the court may
require the lawyer for a court-appointed fidu-
ciary to disclose to the court any acts of mis-
conduct committed by the fiduciary. ACTEC
Commentary on Model Rule 1.6.
C. Conflicts. The bulk of the ethics issues in the
estate planning area arises from conflicts of interest.
These conflicts can be roughly broken down into two
classes-those between clients where there is multi-
party representation and those between the lawyer and
the client.
1. Generally.
a. Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client;
and
(2) each client consents after
consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's respon-
sibilities to another client or to a third person,
or by the lawyer's own interests, unless
(1 )the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after
consultation. When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken,
the consultation shall include explanation of
the implications of the common representa-
tion and the advantages and risks involved.
b. The American Law Institute Restate-
ment of the Law, Tent. Draft No. 4, The Law Govern-
ing Lawyers (1991) ("Restatement") takes a similar
approach:
§ 201: Basic Prohibition of Conflict
of Interest. Unless all affected clients consent to the rep-
resentations under the limitations and conditions provid-
ed in § 202, a lawyer may not represent a client if the
representation would constitute a conflict of interest. A
conflict of interest exists if there is a substantial risk that
the lawyer's representation of the client would be mate-
rially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own inter-
ests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, to
a former client, or to a third person.
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§ 202: (1) A lawyer may
represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of interest
prohibited by § 201 if each affected client gives
informed consent to the lawyer's representation.
Informed consent requires that the client have adequate
information about the risks and advantages of such rep-
resentation to that client.
(2) Notwithstand-
ing each affected client's consent, a lawyer may not
represent a client if:
(a) The
lawyer represents an opposing party in the same litiga-
tion;
(b) One
or more of the clients is legally incapable of giving
consent; or
(c) Spe-
cial circumstances render it unlikely that the lawyer
will be able to provide adequate representation to one
or more of the clients.
c. The Model Code contains similar
provisions. DR 5-105(A) prohibits a lawyer from
accepting employment "if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the
acceptance.. .or if it would likely involve him in rep-
resenting differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C)." DR 5-105(C) pro-
vides that "a lawyer may represent multiple clients if
it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and each consents to the representa-
tion after full disclosure of the possible effect of
such representation on the exercise of his indepen-
dent professional judgment on behalf of each." DR
5-101(A) prohibits a lawyer from accepting employ-
ment where his judgment "reasonably may be affect-
ed by his own financial, business, property, or per-
sonal interests."
2. Conflicts between clients.
a. Husband/Wife. It is common for an
attorney to be approached by one spouse about doing
an estate plan for both spouses. In such cases, the
lawyer's contact will often be primarily with the
spouse that first contacted him or her. If the lawyer is
preparing wills or an estate plan for both, however,
both are the lawyer's clients and both need to be treat-
ed as such. Developments, supra, at 10-11. There is a
wide range of conflicts that can arise when a lawyer
prepares an estate plan for spouses. "Many lawyers
believe the better practice-though not itself required
by the Model Rules [or Code]-is a written agree-
ment... setting forth the ground rules of the representa-
tion at the outset." Hilker, supra at 9. In the Develop-
ments article, supra, the authors provide a list of situa-
tions that flag potential conflicts:
(1) Children by another marriage may
lead to problems because the natural parent of the chil-
dren will often have a stronger desire to provide for
them than his or her spouse.
(2) In community property states,
determination of the status of property as community
or separate is potentially divisive because of the differ-
ing rights such legal statuses provide.
(3) In community property states, the
forced election whereby one spouse must forego his or
her interest in the community property or else lose his
or her right to take under the will is a naturally conflict-
ing situation likely requiring full, impartial explanation
to the electing spouse. Elective rights in noncommuni-
ty property states may cause a similar situation.
(4) Dispositions in trust, whereby the
receiving spouse's rights in the property are limited to
a degree, may give rise to conflicts. This is particular-
ly so with the QTIP Trust since, if no interest in the
principal is given to the surviving spouse, benefits
from such a trust flow only to the first spouse to die.
(5) The choice of a trustee for the
trusts set up for the surviving spouse's benefit may
cause conflict.
(6) Disinheritance as an estate plan-
ning technique can cause conflict.
(7) Even when the initial estate plan
goes smoothly, problems may arise in the future when
one or the other spouse seeks to make a change in the
plan.
(8) Drafting of pre- or post-nuptial
agreements is an inherently adversarial exercise. In
California, simply the fact that a surviving spouse was
not represented by independent counsel at the time an
agreement waiving marital rights was signed may be
enough to nullify the agreement. Cal. Prob. Code §
146(e).
Other potentially divisive estate planning options
are: selection of retirement plan options, gift-giving
programs, and transfers of life insurance. Price, supra,
at 18-12; Wade, When Can a Lawyer Represent Both
Husband and Wife in Estate Planning? Probate &
Property, March-April 1987; Tate, Handling Conflicts
That May Occur in an Estate Planning Practice, 16
Estate Planning, pp. 32-37 (January-February 1989);
Obegi, Handling Conflict of Interest Problems in
Estate Planning, 13 Community Property Journal, pp.
46-72 (January 1987).
b. Parent/Child. Conflicts between par-
ents and children can arise three ways: parents may
overreach when engaging in estate planning involving
a young or youthful child of theirs, children may over-
reach when engaging in estate planning involving an
aged or infirm parent, or conflicts may arise even
where both parties are competent adults. See, Price,
supra, at 18-16, 18-17.
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(1) Cases where parents have been
found to overreach minor or youthful children often
involve trusts or custodial funds. A parent may attempt
to unduly restrict a child's access to funds, or may
abuse his or her position as trustee or custodian by
expending the child's funds for the parent's benefit. In
such cases, if the child was not independently repre-
sented, the trust might be set aside. Price, supra, at
18-16, citing Erdmann v. Erdmann, 67 Wis. 2d 116,
226 N.W.2d 439 (1975) and Jiminez v. Lee, 274 Or.
457, 547 P.2d 126 (1976).
(2) Where aged or infirm parents are
involved, the claim will generally be one of undue
influence or fraud. If an aged parent is a client in an
individual or family estate plan, the lawyer must dis-
cuss the plan with such parent independently, being
held to the duty of loyalty that arises out of Rule 1.7 or
DR 5-105. Price, supra, at 18-17. In one well known
case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that rep-
resentation of both child beneficiary and parent raised
a presumption of undue influence "because the testa-
tor's attorney has placed himself in a conflict of inter-
est and professional loyalty between the testator and
beneficiary." Haynes v. First National State Bank of
New Jersey, 87 N.J. 163, 432 A.2d 890 (1981).
(3) Where representation is simply
multigenerational, with no incompetent parties, con-
flicts might still arise. The problems of restricted con-
trol of trust property, gift programs, and disinheri-
tance, for instance, all are concerns of multigenera-
tional planning. Additionally, business transactions
necessary to an estate plan may cause problems
because of their inherently adversarial nature, and a
family business entity may be yet another possible
client whose interests must be looked out for. Price,
supra, at 18-17; and Developments, supra, at 13.
c. Fiduciary/Beneficiary. Representa-
tion of both a fiduciary and a corresponding beneficia-
ry is problematic because of a fiduciary's duty to treat
all beneficiaries impartially and to exercise discretion
independent of the wishes of the beneficiaries. Price,
supra, at 18-15. When an attorney represents just the
fiduciary, however, he or she should make the benefi-
ciaries aware that the scope of his or her duties does
not include watching out for their individual interests,
and that they need to secure independent counsel for
this purpose. Failure to so inform them that they are
responsible for protecting their interests may amount
to malpractice. Id., citing Linck v. Barokas & Martin,
667 P.2d 171 (Alaska 1983). Generally, acting as
counsel or advisor to a fiduciary may result in a
lawyer's owing fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries as
well. Price, supra, 18-7, citing Morales v. Field, 99
Cal. App. 3d 318, 160 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979) (trust);
Estate of Larson, 103 Wash. 2d 527, 694 P.2d 1051
(1985) (estate); Comment to Rule 1.14 of the Model
Rules (guardianships and conservatorships).
(1) Conventional wisdom and case
law seem to view the fiduciary as the sole client. See,
e.g., Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1258 (1990);
Michigan Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. R-10 (April 19,
1991). See, e.g., Moore, Conflicting Interests in Post-
mortem Planning, 9 U. Miami Inst. Est. Plan 1900
(1975); Moore, Conflicts in Post-Mortem Estate Plan-
ning After the Tax Reform Act, 12 U. Miami Inst. Est.
Plan. 1 105 (1978).
(2) But there seems to be growing
support for the notion that derivative duties are owed
to the beneficiaries. See generally, Hazard, "Triangu-
lar Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis,"
1 Georgetown J. of Legal Ethics 15 (1987); Estate of
Larson, 694 P.2d 1051 (Wash. 1985). See also, Ethics
Panel, "Who is the Client When You Represent the
Fiduciary," paper presented at the fall meeting of The
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, Octo-
ber 9, 1992.
(3) Professor Pennell champions an
entity approach whereby the lawyer must protect the
interests of the beneficiaries as well as the fiduciary.
See, e.g., Pennell, "Representations Involving Fidu-
ciary Entities: Who is the Client," paper presented at
the fall meeting of The American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel, October 9, 1992; N.Y. St. Ethics Op.
No. 512 (1979).
(4) The ACTEC Commentary on
Model Rule 1.2 distinguishes between representation
in a "representative" capacity and "individual" repre-
sentation:
If a lawyer is retained to rep-
resent a fiduciary generally with respect to the fiducia-
ry estate, the lawyer represents the fiduciary in a repre-
sentative and not an individual capacity-the ultimate
objective of which is to administer the fiduciary estate
for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Giving recognition
to the representative capacity in which the lawyer rep-
resents the fiduciary is appropriate because in such
cases the lawyer is retained to perform services that
benefit the fiduciary estate and, derivatively, the bene-
ficiaries-not to perform services that benefit the fidu-
ciary individually. The nature of the relationship is
also suggested by the fact that the fiduciary and the
lawyer for the fiduciary are both compensated from the
fiduciary estate. A lawyer represents the fiduciary gen-
erally (i.e., in a representative capacity) when the
lawyer is retained to advise the fiduciary regarding the
administration of the fiduciary estate or matters affect-
ing the estate. On the other hand, a lawyer represents a
fiduciary individually when the lawyer is retained for
the limited purpose of advancing the interests of the
fiduciary and not necessarily the interests of the fidu-
ciary estate or the persons beneficially interested in the
estate.
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(5) Arguably, this can and should be
worked out and documented at the outset.
The nature and extent of
the lawyer's duties to the beneficiaries of the
fiduciary estate may vary according to the cir-
cumstances, including the nature and extent
of the representation and the terms of any
understanding or agreement among the par-
ties (the lawyer, the fiduciary, and the benefi-
ciaries). ACTEC Commentary on Model
Rule 1.2.
d. Former clients. Rule 1.9 of the Model
Rules provides that a lawyer may not represent a client
in a matter where that client's interests are adverse to
the interests of one of the lawyer's former clients in
the same or similar matter. Also, a lawyer may not use
information from a former representation to the disad-
vantage of a the former client. The duty of confiden-
tiality clearly extends past the termination of the for-
mer representation. Comment to Rule 1.6, above. This
is consistent with the general duty of loyalty required
of lawyers to their clients. Possible issues here are
whether a lawyer can represent a surviving spouse in
changing or renouncing an estate plan the lawyer had
previously drafted for both spouses, and whether a
lawyer who has drafted an estate plan for both spouses
may later represent one spouse in a divorce proceed-
ing. Developments, supra, at 20.
e. Compensation from another party.
Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules and DR 5-107(A)(1) pro-
hibit lawyers from accepting compensation from other
parties for representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation; Rule 1.8 explicitly adds
the requirements of no interference with the lawyer's
independent judgment or the attorney-client relation-
ship, and no breach of confidentiality. The potential
for improper interference in the attorney-client rela-
tionship by someone paying the tab is obvious.
f. Lawyer as advisor or intermediary.
Many conflicts, particularly arising from multiparty
representation, are based at least in part on how we
view the role of the lawyer. The Model Rules take
note of the fact that the role of the lawyer often goes
beyond or differs from the standard paradigm of
lawyer-as-advocate. Rule 2.1 provides that lawyers
may advise their clients, and in doing so may take
into consideration relevant moral, economic, social,
and political factors. Rule 2.2 provides that a lawyer
may act as an intermediary between clients if the
clients consent after being fully informed as to the
risks and advantages of such a method of proceeding
and its effect on the relationships between the par-
ties. The rule requires that the lawyer reasonably
believe that such a method of proceeding will be
workable and to the clients' advantage. If problems
arise, the lawyer is required to withdraw as interme-
diary and is prohibited from representing either party
in the same matter.
3. Conflicts between attorney and client.
a. Fees. Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules
provides that a lawyer's fee shall be reasonable, giving
some factors helpful in that determination, and that the
fee should be communicated to the client, preferably
in writing. The Rule also gives some instructions
regarding contingent fees and the division of fees
between lawyers not in the same firm. The Model
Code prohibits "clearly excessive" fees, DR 2-106(A),
and also gives some instructions on contingent fees
and fee division, DR 2-106(C) and DR 2-107(A).
These rules, however, do not directly address most of
the fee-related issues confronting the estate planner.
Three of these issues are "loss leaders," tax treatment,
and the cost/product tradeoff. Also an issue for estate
planners is dual fees for dual representation.
(1) "Loss leaders" refers to a practice
of estate planning lawyers that was common in the
past, i.e., underbilling "front end" legal work with the
expectation of being selected to do the more lucrative
estate legal work at a later date and possibly recouping
any prior losses at that point. Clearly, when there is
fee manipulation of any sort, it should be closely
examined. An argument can be made that the overall
fee is reasonable even if there is some attempt to
recoup earlier losses, and that "loss leader" billing
technique is not misleading since it is commonplace.
Opponents of "loss leaders," on the other hand, claim
that the lower front end fee may lead to lower quality
estate planning, that it misleads the client as to the
attorney's normal fees, and that recoupment is tempt-
ing and simply unethical. Developments, supra, at 5,
citing Casner, Estate Planning Statesmanship, 8 U.
Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. 12-8 (1974).
(2) Another issue that arises in billing
for estate planning services is the client's tax treatment
of such charges. The Internal Revenue Code § 212(3)
deduction allowed for expenses incurred in connection
with tax determination, collection, or refund makes it
tempting to seek to write off a large portion of estate
planning services when in fact only that portion quali-
fying as tax planning is deductible. Developments,
supra, at 5; Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1). Also, estate plan-
ners are sometimes asked to include estate planning
services for corporate officers in with the general cor-
porate billings, a practice that may inflate corporate
business expenses with ones personal in nature. Devel-
opments, supra, at 5-6, citing Casner, supra, at 12-9.
(3) A third issue arising in the fee area
of estate planning is the propriety of offering the client
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short-term savings on estate planning by preparation
of a simple will or other unsophisticated plan that does
not make use of revocable living trusts and other pro-
bate avoidance devices that may save the client money
in the long run. Developments, supra, at 6.
(4) A final issue is the propriety of
charging dual fees when an attorney serves as both
fiduciary and attorney. Courts have tended to reduce
the attorney's fee in such circumstances, likely reflect-
ing a perception by the court of overlapping duties.
The requirement of "reasonable" fees should actually
take care of this issue.
b. Attorney as beneficiary. Rule 1.8(c)
of the Model Rules states:
A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giv-
ing the lawyer or a person related to the
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse
any substantial gift from the client, including
a testamentary gift, except where the client is
related to the donee.
The Model Code addresses this topic in EC 5-5,
prohibiting a lawyer from "suggest[ing] to his client
that a gift be made to himself or for his benefit." The
Model Rules clearly have more teeth here since they set
forth an almost per se rule (with the exception of the
qualifier "substantial") and so eliminate the need to
show undue influence, which may be difficult even
though a drafter/beneficiary situation is likely to attract
close scrutiny. See, Levin, Legal Ramifications of
Unethical Estate Planning Practices, 124 Trusts &
Estates 47-48 (1985); Johnston, supra, at 60-86. One
possible issue still open, however, is indirect bequests
to a drafting attorney, such as gifts to the attorney's
favorite charity. Price, supra, at 18-18. In such a case,
the disclosure of conflicts requirements in Rule 1.7 and
DR 5-101(A) might apply. Developments, supra, at 24.
c. Attorney as fiduciary. The lawyer
drafting a will or trust has some motivation to have
himself or herself named as executor or trustee of the
estate since there are often substantial fees to be
earned from such service, and the fees are paid out of
estate funds. Thus, there is potential for attorneys
overreaching here. The Model Rules do not explicitly
address this problem, though Rule 1.7, on conflicts,
Rule 1.8(a), on business transactions with the client,
and Rules 7.1-7.3, on advertising and solicitation, are
relevant. EC 5-6 of the Model Code, on the other
hand, provides specifically that "[a] lawyer should not
consciously influence a client to name him as execu-
tor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument." In either
case, there is no proscription of the drafting lawyer
serving as fiduciary of the estate; the focus instead is
on how that appointment comes about. Also relevant
are the problems of multiparty representation and, if
the lawyer appoints him or herself as counsel to the
estate or trust as well, which he or she will have the
power to do as executor, dual fees, which are both dis-
cussed below. See, Haught, Task Force Conducts
Study on Attorneys in Fiduciary Roles, 128 Trusts &
Estates, April, 1989, p. 14 and February, 1988, p. 10;
Brosterhous, Draft Statement on Principles on Attor-
neys Acting as Other Fiduciaries, 128 Trusts &
Estates, December, 1988, p. 12; Tate, Handling Con-
flicts of Interest That May Occur in an Estate Plan-
ning Practice, 16 Estate Planning 32, 36 (1989);
Developments, supra, at 24; Levin, supra, at 49-50;
Price, supra, at 18-19; and Johnston, supra, at 86-101.
In State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 605 (1972), the prac-
tice of a lawyer being named a fiduciary in numerous
cases, based on the sheer numbers, was found to be
unethical.
d. Employment by fiduciary. The drafter
also has some motivation to try to secure appointment
as lawyer for the fiduciary, again because of the fees
generated by the service provided, such fees again
being paid out of the estate or trust.
(1) Designation in instrument. One
route to appointment as attorney for the estate is
explicit designation in the instrument itself. General-
ly, the designation of the lawyer in the instrument is
not binding on the fiduciary. Price, supra, at 18-20.
Nevertheless, it raises questions of overreaching and
solicitation. See, Developments, supra, at 26; Levin,
supra, at 50, 53; and Johnston, supra, at 101-12. It
has been suggested that because such a clause is
unlikely to be requested or challenged by the client, its
insertion is a very subtle sort of solicitation and so
may be even more deplorable than naming oneself as
fiduciary. Developments, supra, at 26, citing John-
ston, supra, at 103.
(2) Corporate fiduciary's policy of
naming draftsman as estate attorney. Another route to
the estate attorney appointment is through appoint-
ment by the corporate fiduciary named in the instru-
ment. At one time corporate fiduciaries had explicit
agreements with bar associations to name the drafter
of the instrument as estate attorney. Although there
are no longer such agreements, since they are subject
to anti-trust challenges, the pattern of appointment in
many jurisdictions suggests there is at least an infor-
mal policy calling for such appointment. Levin, supra,
at 50, 53. Since this is simply an indirect method to
accomplish the same result as naming oneself estate
attorney in the instrument, see above, the same con-
cerns apply. Also, there is a concern that the lawyer's
judgment as to who would be the best fiduciary for his
or her particular client may be affected. See, Develop-
ments, supra, at 26-27; Levin, supra, at 50, 53; and
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Johnston, supra, at 115-20. Wisconsin has addressed
this by adopting a statute giving beneficiaries 30 days
following the appointment of a corporate fiduciary to
name an estate attorney, if none was named in the will.
Wis. Stat. Ann. §856.3 1. Developments, supra, at 27.
(3) Safekeeping of wills. Safekeeping
of clients' wills has in the past been used as a method
of securing appointment as estate attorney, the reason-
ing being that the beneficiaries or fiduciary will have to
come to the lawyer to get the will, and so will be more
inclined to hire that lawyer because of that contact.
This is clearly a subtle form of solicitation. However,
safekeeping of a client's will can also be a valuable ser-
vice to the client. Again, the propriety of the practice
will depend on the circumstances. See, Developments,
supra, at 28; Johnston, supra, at 124-33.
4. Avoidance, Mitigation, Withdrawal.
Where conflicts or other problems arise or are likely
to arise, the estate planner has basically three methods
of proceeding: avoidance, mitigation, or withdrawal.
Price, supra, at 18-9. If the lawyer is able to spot the
potential for problems ahead of time, he or she can
arrange the relationship with the client or client in
such a way as to avoid conflicts. Most clearly, the
lawyer can simply insist that parties need to have
independent representation. Another option is for the
lawyer to make clear that he or she is serving as an
intermediary per Rule 2.2, above. Or, the lawyer may
inform the clients ahead of time of the risks of multi-
ple party representation, and make clear that he or she
must not be the keeper of any intraclient secrets, oth-
erwise independent representation will be necessary.
Once a conflict has arisen, if the conflict is not of a
serious enough nature to require independent repre-
sentation, the lawyer may, per Rule 1.7, mitigate the
problem by obtaining the client's consent to proceed
after full disclosure to the client of the conflict and
any possible risk or risks involved in proceeding. The
tough call here, of course, is whether the conflict is so
serious as to require independent representation. If
the determination is made that the conflict is indeed
too serious to allow the attorney-client relationship to
proceed, withdrawal is required, per Rule 1.16 or DR
2-110. Rule 1.16 and DR 2-110 provide that a lawyer
shall withdrawal from representation in certain cir-
cumstances, the most applicable here being where
failure to do so would result in the violation of the
Model Rules or the Model Code, respectively. If a
lawyer was acting as an intermediary, he or she must
withdrawal from representation of all parties. If the
lawyer was not acting in that special role, however, he
or she need only withdrawal from representation of
enough parties to remove the conflict. Developments,
supra, at 21, 22.
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